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SEPARABILITY AND THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rule Against Perpetuities has been the subject of much
misunderstanding and misapprehension. When faced with a prob-
lem involving an application of the rule, many a practitioner is
apt to quickly recall a fuzzily remembered definition and the name
Gray.1 The rule in its simplest form provides that no interest will
be allowed to stand unless that interest vests within twenty-one
years of a life in being. The operation of the rule is, however, not
simple, and various qualifying doctrines such as the doctrine of
separability have served to further complicate the rule. Separa-
bility developed as a method to isolate parts of a disposition which
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities while preserving the parts
which do not.
To better understand the use of separability under the Rule
Against Perpetuities, consider the situation2 where testator T
devises life estates in Blackacre equally among his two children,
A and B. The life estates of A and B are followed by life estates
in the children of A and B (the grandchildren of T). These grand-
children are to take the share of their respective parents per stirpes.
The remainder in fee is left to the children of T's grandchildren
per stirpes. At T's death A and B are living. A has two then
living children A1 and A2. B has one child then living, B 1. Sub-
sequent to T's death another child, B2, is born to B. A1, A2, B1 and
B2 each have two children born after T's death; w, and W2, x , and
x2, y, and y2, and z1 and z2 respectively.
Diagramatically the devise would appear as follows: 3
1. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PEmPETuITEs (ed. 1942).
2. See Smith's Estate v. Comm'n., 140 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944) for
similar situations.
3. The symbols used in illustration one will be incorporated in the
later illustrations. Squares represent persons born before testator died;
circles represent persons born after testator died; and, triangles represent
hypothetical persons.
T} Testator
A AeChildren d Testator'
(Life Estates)
Ai B2 B2 Grandchildren ofTestator
(Life Estates)
Great GrandcheidrgnW1 Wx X1 X2 y7t 12 21 Z2 of TostatOt
i e (Remainder in be re
-Hypothetical After Born.O -Born After Death QI Testator
U -Born Before Death of Testator
(Illustration One)
The hypothetical child and hypothetical grandchild of A, designated
by the triangles H and H1 are not actual persons born but mere
hypothetical persons.
This devise will clearly violate the Rule Against Perpetuities by
the remainder over to the children of B2, z1 and z2, under the pos-
sibilities test 4, and may violate the rule under the actualities test.5
The disposition also carries the "possibility" of a violation arising
from the hypothetical after-born H 1.3 The question presented to
the practitioner representing parties to the devise with seemingly
valid interests is what becomes of their interests in the face of
these violations of the Rule Against Perpetuities. This Comment
will explore the use of separability to preserve those parts of a
devise which do not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Many view the Rule Against Perpetuities as the legal Rock of
Gibralter, an unchanging maxim of legal wisdom to be invoked
with a mystical reverence. The courts have wielded the sacred
sword of the rule with such perfunctory certainty to suggest that
the rule has acquired the definiteness and dignity of an Eleventh
Commandment. Gray in his learned work The Rule Against Per-
petuities, has contributed greatly to this impression, and few
authors have been able to match the detail or approach the rule
in a manner adding much to Gray's. Notwithstanding the pre-
4. E.g. Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 149-50, 116 A. 392, 394 (1922).
5. Estates Act of 1947, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950) changed
the determinative test to actualities rather than possibilities. Estates Act
of 1947 is now embodied in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (1972).
6. See Jones Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437 (Alleg. O.C. 1962).




dominant reliance on the authority of Gray, the Rule Against Per-
petuities is and has been in a state of modification since its in-
ception.8
The rule itself developed in response to indestructible contin-
gent remainders. 9 The indestructible contingent remainder made
possible the perpetual incumbering of property by the will of the
dead to the disadvantage of the living. The courts of England
realizing the unacceptable consequences involved established the
foundations of the rule "to prevent the tying up of property."10
Arrival at a workable rule was not without its difficulties.
The courts first concerned themselves with the nature of the con-
tingent interest rather than a permissible period of vesting." The
shift of concern from the nature of the contingency to the period
of vesting points to the policy considerations underlying the rule:
The desire to allow free disposition of property acquired by the
present generation, even if the desires of the disposers will take
effect beyond the grave, and the desire to allow future generations
to take and hold property unfettered by the control of the past."
Gray defined the rule as follows:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
that twenty-one years after some life in being at the cre-
ation of the interest.
13
In the hypothetical situation presented previously in illustra-
tion one, A and B, the children of the testator T, and A,, A2, B1,
grandchildren of T, are lives in being at the creation of the interest.
The application of the rule as defined by Gray to the situation
thus presented would mean that the contingent remainders to
w1, w2, x1, x2, y1, Y2, zl and z2 must vest within twenty-one years
after the deaths of these lives in being. It is of course noted that
the interests of wl, w2, x1, x2, y. and y2, the children of A,, A2 and
B, will necessarily vest within the period permitted since the vesting
of their interests will occur upon the death of their parent, a life
in being.
8. See generally L. SIMES, FuTURE INTERESTS §§1211-21 (2d ed. 1966).
9. Id. at § 122. Prior to the Statute of Uses the executory interest
was not recognized. After the Statute of Uses the executory interest was
recognized and "in 1620 it was held indestructible." See also GRAY, supra
note 6 at §§ 153-168.
10. L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, LAW OF "UTURE INTERESTS § 1222 (2d ed.
1956).
11. L. SIME AD A. Slvirm, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS § 1213 (2d ed.
1956).
12. L. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PENN L. REV.
707 (1955).
13. GRAY, supra note 6 at § 201.
It can be seen from this hypothetical situation that if A, B, A1,
A2, and B1 predecease B 2 (which is not improbable considering B2
is the youngest of the grandchildren), there will be no one in ex-
istence who was a life in being at the creation of the interest when
the interests of z1 and z2 vest. It is further possible
14 that B2 will
live more than twenty-one years beyond the deaths of A1, A2 and B,
with the result that the vesting of the interests in z, and z2 will
occur later than twenty-one years after lives in being, the per-
missible period for vesting under the rule.
Of course, the rule encompasses much more than what may be
apparent from Gray's definition. 5 Gray wrote his treatise resolv-
ing and clarifying the numerous considerations arising from this
"apparently" concise statement. In Lucas v. Hamm the California
Supreme Court recognized the complexity of the rule and held that
a lawyer was not negligent in failing to understand the Rule
Against Perpetuities.1 6
In the United States the rule has been subjected to statutory
modifications, 17 but many of these legislative departures from the
common law rule have little modem significance apart from their
historical reference value. Most jurisdictions have reinstated the
common law form of the rule.'8
Pennsylvania has based statutes addressed to the subject 9 on
the common law rule, but has sought to remedy difficulties arising
from the common law form.20 Prior to the enactment of the Estates
Act of 194721 the Rule Against Perpetuities in Pensylvania pro-
hibited the creation of future interests or estates which, by possi-
bility, may not become vested within twenty-one years of a life
or lives in being at the death of the testator, together with the
period of gestation.2 2 The Estates Act of 1947 changed the deter-
mining test from the possibility of vesting outside the permissible
period to an actual vesting outside the period,2 ' while retaining
14. The determinative test here is the possibilities test rather than
the actualities test. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
15. See generally GRAY, supra note 6 at Chap. VI.
16. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 827, 384 P.2d 685 (1961). See also
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1349 (1954) "[the rule against perpetuities] is a dangerous instru-
mentality in the hands of most members of the bar."
17. E.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2952 (1888); Miss. CODE ANN. §
2117 (1930); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-40 (1939).
18. But cf. N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney
1967).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3251-2 (1950); Act of 1853, Apr. 18, P.L. 503,
§ 9; Act of 1931, Apr. 14, P.L. 29, No. 27, § 1; Act of 1939, May 25, P.L. 201,
9§ 1 and 2, repealed PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.20 (1950).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950). See Commisioner's Com-
ment subsec. (b). Current statutory provision found at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 6104 (1972).
21. PA. STAT ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (1972).
22. E.g. In re Lockhart's Estate, 306 Pa. 394, 159 A. 874 (1932); Lilley's
Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392 (1922).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (1972).
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the common law considerations not inconsistent with such a change
in determination.
2 4
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has formulated three
policies to explain the Rule Against Perpetuities. Citing Gray in
Lewis Estate25 the court stated that the purpose of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is to forward the circulation of property.26 In Friday's
Estate27 the supreme court phrased the foundation policy of the
rule as the "freedom of alienability of property," 28 whereas in
Warren's Estate2 9 the court announced that the purpose of the.
rule was "to prohibit the undue limitation and prolongation of
estates.
30
It is not difficult to see that property which is subject to a
contingency will suffer in marketability. The present interest
holder must find a buyer who is willing to either: (1) take the
property subject to the contingent interests, or (2) find the con-
tingent interest holders and secure their interests from them.
Few buyers would view alternative (1) as attractive, and alterna-
tive (2) poses two problems. First, the contingent interest holders
may not yet be in existence, making any attempts to acquire these
interests futile. And second, the holder of a remotely possible
contingent interest may be able to extract from the buyer a price
far above the real worth of the interest. The policy foundations
set forth in Friday's Estate"1 are perhaps misleading by couching
the policy motives for the rule in terms of alienability, rather than
the broader terminology used in Lewis Estate,3 2 forwarding the
circulation of property.
38
The Restatement of Property expressed the policy consideration
behind the rule as the desire to "preserve property free from incon-
venient fetterings. ' '3 4 Such inconvenient fettering is seen as "un-
desirable in its social consequences. '3 5 The Restatement in its
historical discussion of the rule provided:
24. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950) Commisioner's Comment
subsec. (b). Current statutory provision found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 6104 (1972).
25. 349 Pa. 571, 37 A.2d 482 (1944).
26. Id. at 573, 37 A.2d at 484.
27. Friday's Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 A. 123 (1933).
28. Id. at 332, 170 A. at 125.
29. Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 A. 396 (1936).
30. Id. at 113, 182 A. at 396.
31. 313 Pa. 328, 170 A. 123 (1933).
32. 349 Pa. 571, 37 A.2d 482 (1944).
33. Id. at 573, 37 A.2d at 484.
34. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 370, comments a and c (1944).
35. Id. at comment c.
[The] social interest in preserving property from excessive
fettering rests partly upon the necessities of maintaining a
going society controlled primarily by its living members,
partly upon the social desirability of facilitating the utiliza-
tion of wealth, partly upon the social desirability of keeping
property responsive to the current exigencies of its current
beneficial owners, and partly upon the competitive basis
of modern society.
8 6
Given these policy guidelines, there are no absolute reasons why
the rule has adopted the particular time limitations of lives in
being and twenty-one years, but their adoption can be rationalized.
The lives in being limitation can be easily rationalized as the
desire to allow one to dispose of one's property to those known
to the donor.3T More than likely, these recipients are the relatives
of the testator, or some other persons who would be the natural
beneficiaries of the testator. The rationale behind the twenty-one
year extension period can be seen as a development from the cases
where the contingent remainderman's interest (usually a grand-
child) would not vest until the contingent remainderman reached
majority.88 Thus, in a situation where the contingent remainder-
man is a grandchild of the testator born after the testator's death,
the supporting life estate is in the contingent remainderman's
parent, a child of the testator, and the remainder is contingent on
the grandchild reaching majority, the dispositive scheme would not
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. The grandchild must neces-
sarily reach majority within the period allowed by the rule. Al-
though the twenty-one year period will allow the testator to exercise
greater control over the property in opposition to the policy
motives for the rule,39 the period closely follows the rationale
behind permitting the lives in being period.40
Finally, there is the gestation allowance which is addressed
to problems of a child en ventre sa mere. This allowance serves
two purposes. First, a child en ventre sa mere is treated as a life
in being at the point of conception, thus allowing a child conceived
before but born after the testator's death to be a life in being at
the point of conception, rather than at the point of birth. And
secondly, the gestation allowance extends the twenty-one year
vesting period to include actual periods of gestation.41
Allowing interests to vest in persons far removed in existence
from the testator is not supportable under the policy motive that
there is some social desirability to permit the testator to control
the method of passage of his property to known individuals. 4
2
36. REStATEMENT OF PROPERTY Introductory Note pp. 2132-3 (1944).
37. See generally L. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U.
PENN. L. REV. 707 (1955).
38. GRAY, supra note 6 at § 176.
39. See notes 37 and 38 supra.
40. See generally GRAY, supra note 6 at §§ 171-185.
41. L. Snviss, FuruRE INTEREsTS § 122 (2d ed. 1966).
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Control of the property at a point beyond which the testator will
know who will be subjected to this control is clearly a manifesta-
tion of control in the property by the testator rather than a mani-
festation of control directed toward particular individuals. The
presumption is that the control directed at known particular indi-
viduals will be beneficial to them (at least the testator thinks
so),4" whereas control directed solely at the property is the fet-
tering which it is the rule's goal to invalidate.
44
It is submitted that control directed toward individuals, al-
though it too is a fettering of the property, is acceptable under
a belief that the testator's chief concern will be the individual's
well-being (because usually the individual is a close relative) and
that the desirability of allowing a testator to distribute his wealth
to the benefit of others who are the natural recipients of the
testator's affections overrides the undesirability of fettering the
wealth at all.
The change in 1947 from a possibilities to an actualities test
in Pennsylvania 4" is entirely consistent with the policy rationale
set forth above, for under the possibilities test, returning to the
hypothetical situation in illustration one, it would not matter
whether A, B, A1, A2 and B1 predeceased B2 and that B 2 would die,
causing zi's and z2's interests to vest, more than twenty-one years
after the death of the last sibling, for the determinative factor
is the possibility of such an occurrence. 46 Under the actualities or
wait and see method, unless that particular situation in actuality
arose to invalidate the remainders to z, and z2 the rule would not
affect the dispositive scheme.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARABILITY
Under the possibilities test the remainders to z, and z2 in
illustration one, are repugnant to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
41
The question arises of what effect this violation of the rule has
on the dispositive scheme as a whole. There are two possible solu-
tions: (1) void the entire dispositive scheme,4" or (2) separate
42. See notes 25-30 and 34-36 and accompanying text supra regrading
policy considerations.
43. E.g., Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 149, 116 A. 392, 394 (1922).
44. Id.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (1972).
46. W. BuRBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 185 (3d ed.
1965).
47. See notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text supra.
48. E.g., iUlley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392 (1922).
the invalid portions of the scheme from the valid portions allowing
the valid parts to stand.
49
The former solution is used mainly in two situations. The
first appears where the intent of the dispositive scheme is to tie
up property beyond the period of the rule.5 ° In such a disposition
the bequests prior to the invalid portions are merely incidental
to the accomplishment of this goal.51 The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania in Lilley's Estate52 found that the testator's intention in
devising his coal company and farm land to be held in trust by the
testator's nephews was not to benefit the relatives but rather to
exercise control over the property beyond the grave.53 The
[t]estator did not consider relatives or persons, his mind
was fixed on one specific object,-the amassing of a great
estate, to be divided as his ultimate gift at the end of
ninety-nine years.
5 4
The court voided the entire dispositive plan based on the finding
that the "prior estate was a mere agency to accomplish a transgres-
sion of the rule."55
The second situation which will generally require the voiding
of the entire dispositive scheme is where the separation of the
valid portions of the devise from those portions invalidated as
violative of the rule will so destroy the dispositive scheme that
it can no longer be capable of fulfilling the testator's intent.r6  In
Lilley's Estate the court phrased the policy as:
[W] here the limitations of the prior and ulterior estates
are so intimately and inseparably intertwined that the
future of the limitation of the latter disturbs the main and
dominant purpose of the testator, of which the prior
limitations are a part, such prior and ulterior estates are
void. .... . 1
Emasculation of testator's scheme was set forth in the Mc-
Caskey Estate5" as the guide to void the entire disposition, and
destruction of the organic plan of the testator was used in Quigley's
Estate5 9 and in Kamerly Estate.60 For an application of these
policies, whether the testator's scheme has been "emasculated"
or his "organic plan" destroyed, consider the situation in Jones
49. E.g., Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
50. Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392 (1922).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 149-50, 116 A. at 394-5.
54. Id. at 155, 116 A. at 397.
55. Id. at 153, 116 A. at 396.
56. Id. See also Kamerly Estate, 348 Pa. 225, 35 A.2d 258 (1944);
Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938); Kern's Estate, 296 Pa. 348,
145 A. 824 (1929); McCaskey's Estate, 293 Pa. 497, 143 A. 209 (1928).
57. Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 153, 116 A. 392, 396 (1922).
58. 293 Pa. 497, 143 A. 209 (1928).
59. 329 Pa. 281, 289, 198 A. 85, 88 (1938).
60. Kamerly Estate, 348 Pa. 225, 227, 35 A.2d 258, 259 (1944).
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Estate.61  In that case the testator left a portion of his estate
to his daughter. This portion was to pass equally to the children
of this daughter for life or in remainder when these grandchildren
of the testator married and had issue. All three grandchildren of
the testator were living at the testator's death, but because the
determinative test was the possibilities rather than actualities test
the dispositive scheme was attacked on the possibility of an after-
born child of the testator's daughter, even though in actuality
there was none. The court in determining the intent of the testator
stated the "[t]estator's immediate solicitude was for the welfare
of his daughter and his grandchildren. There is no apparent ulte-
rior motive to defer distribution to some remote fixed time as an
end in itself."6 2 The court goes on further to say:
We do not hesitate to conclude that, if [the] testator knew
that the trust would be held void as to a child of his daugh-
ter born after [the] testator's death, he would have never-
theless intended [that] the valid portions of the trust should
remain intactea
Diagramatically the situation in Jones Estate might be ex-
pressed as follows:
TESTATOR
E. HORNE -(Daughter of Testator)
M. AUSTIN F. VOSS F. HORNE pothetical After-Born
, L...... Child of E. Horne
Married & Married & Married
Issue Issue No Issue
(Illustration Two)
The hypothetical after-born child of E. Horne may possibly
not marry and have issue (marriage plus having issue causing the
interest to vest) within twenty-one years after the deaths of the
lives in being at the creation of the interest.14 Such a possibility
is a violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, as was pointed out
61. 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437 (Alleg. O.C. 1962).
62. Id. at 453.
63. Id.
64. Under the possibilities test, possible or hypothetical persons are
used in applying the rule even though these hypothetical persons never
come into existence.
in the case.65 Under the actualities test, however, the court would
have waited until the end of the period allowed before voiding
any interest as violating the Rule Against Perpetuities.66
In determining what effect a violation of the rule will have
on the disposition the court will first ascertain the intent of the
testator 7 Assuming the court determines that the disposition is
not merely an agency to violate the rule,68 and that a separation
of the invalid portions from the valid portions will not so emasculate
or destroy the organic plan of the testator,69 separation will be
allowed.70 The question now presents itself, how will this separa-
tion be carried out.
IV. TYPES OF SEPARABILrTY
Separability is the judicial isolation of a particular interest
or interests, within a testamentary or other dispositive scheme,
from other interests in the same scheme, so that failure of an
isolated interest to comply with the necessary requirements of the
Rule Against Perpetuities will not infect the whole scheme so
as to destroy otherwise valid interests.7 1  Separability can be
broadly classified under three headings: (1) Horizontal Separa-
bility,' 2 (2) Vertical Separability,73 and (3) Severable Shares
(Subclasses) .74
A. Horizontal Separability
Horizontal separability is the judicial separation and isola-
tion of a preceding, supporting estate from a remainder interest
which violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.75 In illustration one
65. Jones Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437, 451 (Alleg. OC. 1962).
66. Id. at 452. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (1972).
67. Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 148, 116 A. 392, 394 (1922) ("the rule
is to be applied after testator's intentions are discovered"); and Feeney's
Estate, 293 Pa. 273, 278, 142 A. 284, 287 (1928) ("in construing a will, we
first find the intention of the testator, and then, if as a result of that
determination, the vesting of an estate is possibly postponed beyond the
time allowed by the rule against perpetuities, the rule controls"). These
cases should be distinguished from Lydia Seidal Throm's Estate, 45 Berks
223 (Pa. O.C. 1953) where the court states that in construing a will, the
Rule Against Perpetuities should be applied in complete disregard of the
testator's intentions. In Throm the disregard urged is not that the court
should fail to determine the testator's intent but rather the rule by its nature
serves to frustrate the intent of the testator, and that the rule's application
will necessarily be opposed to the testator's intention to tie up property
beyond the permissible period. See also Friday's Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 334,
170 A. 123, 125-6 (1933).
68. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
70. E.g., Quigley's Etate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 461, 72 A.2d 587 (1950).
74. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 140 F.2d
759 (3d Cir. 1944).
75. Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
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the concept of horizontal separability would permit the separation
of the life estate in B2 from the invalid remainders in z1 and z2.
B 2 would be permitted to take the life estate even though the sub-
sequent remainders in his children will be void. To express the
horizontal separability graphically it could appear as follows:
7 6
T Testator
Bn Chidren of Testaor
Horizonta Sep. eA 
Life Estates)
ZH' Bi 1 Grandchildren of
aybe hro l s t T , ay i Great Grandchildren(A J (Remainder in fee)
S-Born After Death. of Testatorrn-Born Before Death of Testator
(Illustration Three)
The horizontal lines are used to denote where the interests
may be horizontally separated. Thus, any invalid interests below
a line can be separated from the preceding supporting interests, and
if the invalid interest is struck down as void because it is re-
pugnant to the rule, the interest above the line will not be affected
by the voiding.7 7  The interests of A,, A2, B and B2 Must, Of
necessity, vest within twenty-one years after lives in being be-
cause A and B, their respective parents, are lives in being.
In Quigley's Estate7  , the court intimated that there is an
underlying justification for allowing a separation of interests when
the court listed what it considered the dominant, primary intention
of the testator.7 9
What the testator has done here is to make primary pro-
vision for his own flesh and blood, first for his son, and then
for his son's children. . . . Being, however, warmly at-
tached . . ,to his sisters, his niece and the latter's children,
76. I.
77. See, e.g., Edward's Estate, 407 Pa. 512, 515, 180 A.2d 590, 591-2
(1962); Ewalt v. Davenhill, 257 Pa. 385, 390-1, 101 A. 756, 758 (1917).
78. 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
79. Id. at 290-1, 198 A. at 89.
he provides that the income of half of the estate shall go
in this collateral line, and all of it if his son dies without
issue.""
The court was able to view the intentions of the testator separately,
first to provide for his son and his son's children and second to
provide for the testator's other relatives. Thus, when the disposi-
tion threatened to run afoul of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the
court, following the logic of previous cases allowing horizontal
separability,81 was not going to penalize the testator by striking
down the valid provisions for attempting to spread his bounty
beyond the limitations of the rule.
B. Severed Shares, Subclasses
Recognizing that the life estates of A, A2, B, and B2 in illus-
tration one will be protected from attack as being violative of the
Rule Against Perpetuities by the doctrine of horizontal separa-
bility,8 2 the next question is what effect will the rule have on the
remainder interests in the great grandchildren of T. The possible
answers are similar to those propounded in regard to the doctrine
of separability generally.8 3 The first possibility would be to void
all the remainder interests if one is found violative of the rule.
4
The alternative would be to separate the valid interests from the
invalid.8 5 The first possibility generally arises in cases where the
remainder interests are in members of one class,86 or perhaps
only arguably members of one class.8 7 The general rule is that a
gift to a class would be void if the interest to any member of that
class would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. 8
In the leading case of Leake v. Robinson,"9 it was held that
the direction by the testator to the trustees to pay the brothers
and sisters of the primary beneficiary should that primary benefi-
ciary die without issue constituted a gift to a class, and that the
class would stand or fail as a whole.90
Failure of a class gift in toto occurs in situations where all the
members of the class will not be determined within the period
80. Id.
81. See note 78 supra.
82. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text supra.
84. E.g., Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Chancery
1817).
85. E.g., Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950).
86. See L. SnmEs, FuruR, INTEmSTS, § 134 (2d ed. 1966) and 56 A.L.R.
2d 450, 451-2 and GRAY, supra note 6 at Chap. X. See generally 51 HARV. L.
REV. 254 (1937).
87. See Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. 10, 16 A. 579 (1889).
88. Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Chancery 1817).
89. 2 Meriv 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Chancery 1817).
90. Id. at 378, 35 Eng. Rep. at 985, and 56 A.L.R.2d 450, 458. Cattlin
v. Brown, 11 Hare 372, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (Chancery 1853).
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allowed by the rule."1 (Where all the members will be determined
within lives in being and twenty-one years after, there is no
problem.) It can be seen that where the number of members of
the class are not determinable and separation will be plagued by
the uncertainty of what share each would take, attempts at separa-
tion will be difficult if not altogether impossible. Such problems
do not arise where the gift to the class is divided by the testator
into separate shares to each member of the class 92 for there is no
uncertainty as to what each member will be entitled. In some cases
this separation into definite shares is not expressly delineated in
the dispositive instrument but follows from the construction of the
disposition." An example of this delineation in construction rather
than delineation by express terms can be found in Smith's Estate
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.94 In that case the testator
provided a life estate for his daughter. After the daughter's death,
income shares were to be paid to the daughter's children (referred
to as Class One by the court)95 with the principle to be paid over
to them when and if they reached the age of 25. In the event of
the death of a member of Class One, that decedent's share
would pass to his surviving child or children.9 6
In viewing the groups designated by the testamentary instru-
ment the court found that although the children of the members of
Class One are designated commonly in the instrument, these chil-
dren are better considered as separate subclasses rather than as one
class,97 each subclass composition being the children of a single
member of Class One.95 With reference to illustration one there
are three possible distinct classes: (1) the children of the testator,
(2) the grandchildren of the testator, and (3) the great grand-
children of the testator. Were the rule set forth in Leake v.
Robinson (all members of a class must take or none will take)
applied, failure by any member of the class to take because his
interest did not vest within the period permitted by the Rule
Against Perpetuities, would void the taking by the other members
91. For evample: a gift of $1000 each to my grandchildren who reach
22 years of age. Contra Lawrence v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149, 45 N.E. 239 (1896)
where the court would not separate the members receiving lump sums
upon reaching 25 years of age on the grounds that such a separation would
be against the testator's intentions.
92. Smith's Estate v. Comm'r., 140 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 762.
95. Id. at 761.
96. Id. at 763.
97. Id.
98. Id.
in the class even though their interests had vested. Applying
the reasoning used in Smith's Estate99 these classes can be further
refined into categories of subclasses. 00 In the hypothetical situa-
tion in illustration one, A, and A2 would form a subclass of the
grandchildren of T and B, and B2 would form another. In the class
of the great grandchildren of T the subclasses would be as follows:
subclass one, w, and w2; subclass two, x, and x2; subclass three, yj
and y2; and subclass four, z, and z2. Adding these classifications
to illustration one would appear as follows:
TI Testator
A.B. Children of Testator
Is i(Life Estates)
At A2 11 -3 Grandchildreni ofIT stator
ThY -cri(Life Estates)
Great Grandchildren
t w x1 x2 Brown i of Testator
or n e r(Remainder in fee)
Sbclass One Sub. Two Sub. Three Sub. Four
Q -Born After Death of Testator
F -Bue n Before Death of Testator
(Illustration Four)
The court in Smith's Estate applying the guidelines set forth in
the case of Cattlin v. Brown'" stated that application of the all
or none rule as pertaining to a class gift, enumerated in Leake1
0 2
was a "clear-cut mistake of law,"10' The "class" was capable of
separation in several separate subclass gifts; the failure of one as
being repugnant to the Rule Against Perpetuities will not cause
the voiding of the remaining valid subclasses.'1
0 4
Subclass four, in illustration three, consisting of z, and Z2
is or will be in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.' 0 ' The
remainder interests to the members of subclasses one, two and three
can be preserved by application of the doctrine presented in Smith's
Estate. Subclass four will be separated from the remaining sub-
classes and the effect of its failure to comply with the requirements
99. 140 F.2d 754, 763-4 (3d Cir. 1944).
100. Id.
101. Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372, 377, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319, 1321 (Chan-
cery 1953).
102. Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Chancery
1817).
103. Smith's Estate, 140 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1944).
104. Id.
105. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
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of the Rule Against Perpetuities will be isolated to that particular
subclass.
The Restatement of Property stated the same concept of sever-
ability in section 389, Class Gifts-Severed Shares:
When the provisions of a dispositive instrument include
(a) a limitation in favor of a class under which member-
ship in the class can increase, but can neither increase nor
decrease for longer than the maximum period described in
§ 374; and
(b) a further limitation, with regard to each of the shares
in which the members of the class described in Clause
(a) have been given interests, in favor of the children, or
issue, or heirs, of such class member, or in other language of
similar import, then the attempted disposition is treated
as consisting of separable limitations with respect to the
distinct shares of the several members of the class described
in Clause (a), and the validation of the disposition, at-
tempted with respect to each such severed share and de-
scribed in Clause (b), is determined separately under the
rule against perpetuities. 100
Clause (a) would refer to the subclasses A, and A2, and B, and
B 2 in illustration three, while Clause (b) would refer to subclasses
one, two, three and four in the illustration. The emphasis on
stirpital distribution follows the reasoning formulated in Cattlin
v. Brown'0 7 requiring a definite ascertainment of the shares to pass
to a particular subclass in order to make that subclass separable. 0 8
C. Vertical Separability
The term "vertical separability" was first suggested in Harrah
Estate'0 9 as the label of a separation of the void remainder to a
hypothetical child of the cestui que trust from the legal remainders
to the actual born children.1" 0 The situation presented in the case
involved a will by which the testator devised a trust with income for
life to his son, George. Upon George's death one-third of the
income was to go to George's widow for life. Subject to the
widow's one-third interest, the children of George were to share
the income equally for life with remainder to their children. Em-
ploying the same schematic representation used in the previous
illustrations, the devise would be as follows:
106. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 389 (1944).
107. 11 Hare 372, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (Chancery 1853).
108. Id.
109. Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 463, 72 A.2d 587, 592 (1950).
110. Id. "[TI hat separation of legal remainders from illegal remainders




Hypothetical JULIUS CHILD X CHILD Y CHILD Z
Hypothetical Remainder Remainder Rermainder Remainder
Remainder
(Illustration Five)
George had four children living at the testator's death: Julius,
child x, child y, and child z. No children were subsequently born.
The disposition was attacked as violative of the Rule Against Per-
petuities on the basis that the interest of the hypothetical child
of George born after the testator's death might not vest within the
period allowed by the rule."' The court following the guidelines
established in Cattlin v. Brown ' 12 and the Restatement of Property
section 389 held that the remainder to the heirs of the hypothe-
tical child would not void remainders to the heirs of the actual
born children." 3  Most importantly, however, the court went be-
yond Cattlin v. Brown and the Restatement for the basis of the
holding. The court chose to include the policy considerations set
forth in the Estates Act of 1947,114 although the act would not
apply to this particular disposition, and the court chose to include
the rationale of Quigley's Estate and related horizontal separa-
bility cases." 5 Mr. Chief Justice Maxey, for the court, stated:
[W] e find no reason in logic or in public policy why the
whole remainder should be adjudged void because the re-
mainder to the heirs of George's hypothetical child born
after testator's death would violate the rule against per-
petuities.116
In applying the doctrine of horizontal separability there is the
consideration whether separation of the void interests from the
valid would emasculate the testator's plan of distribution. '17 This
111. Note that this disposition is considered under the possibilities
rather than the actualities test because the will was executed before January
1, 1948, which is the effective date of the Estates Act of 1947. PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 302.21 (1950).
112. 11 Hare 372, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (Chancery 1853); Harrah Estate,
364 Pa. 451, 456 and 460-1, 72 A.2d 587, 589 and 591 (1950).
113. Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 463, 72 A.2d 587, 592 (1950).
114. Id. at 456-7, 72 A.2d at 589.
115. Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
116. Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 457, 72 A.2d 587, 589-90 (1950).
117. Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
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consideration of emasculation also has been held to apply to an
application of vertical separability.11 Thus, the separation of the
void interest in the heirs of the hypothetical child was not seen
as destructive of the "organic plan of the testator." 119
In applying the principle of vertical separability the Orphans'
Court of Allegheny County in Jones Estate120 stated that:
[The supreme court] very clearly set forth that it was not
deciding Harrah Estate merely on the basis of section 389,
but it was adopting the rationale of the Quigley case cited
therein. Now it is definitely decided without regard to
the Estates Act of 1947, that the philosophy behind the
rationale of the separation of valid life estates from invalid
remainders is now the philosophy behind the separation of
valid remainders from invalid remainders.
121
The court in Jones Estate emphasized that "public policy and the
social welfare"'122 are the basis for use of the Rule Against Per-
petuities, and that:
Public policy and the social welfare do not demand that the
remainders [to the heirs of a hypothetical after born child]
in the case at bar be declared invalid nor do they demand
that testator's "plan of distribution" or "the organic plan of
the testator" be frustrated and nullified because of the
possible birth of a hypothetical child ... 122
It is submitted that the consideration of the organic plan of
the testator in Jones Estate differs from the consideration in
Quigley's Estate and related cases. In Quigley's Estate the con-
sideration of the organic plan is applied negatively. That is, the
disposition with the separation and isolation of the portions which
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities must meet the test of whether
the remaining portions result in a dispositive situation which is
consistent with the testator's intentions as manifested by the
original disposition before separation. 12 4  Conversely in Jones
Estate preservation of the testator's organic plan is not used to
test the disposition after vertical separation, but is a positive factor
which the court will not allow to be frustrated or nullified because
of a disallowance of separability.
125
To clarify this difference consider the hypothetical situation
118. Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 462-3, 72 A.2d 587, 592 (1950).
119. Id. at 463, 72 A.2d 587 at 592.
120. Jones Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437 (Alleg. O.C. 1962).
121. Id. at 457.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 291, 198 A. 85, 89 (1938).
125. Jones Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437, 457 (Alleg. O.C. 1962).
in illustration one. The consideration of the testator's organic
plan in regard to horizontal separability would be done as follows:
First, the determination is made whether the valid estates are mere
agencies to reach the invalid estates in violation of the rule;12 6
second, compare the remaining disposition after separation to the
organic plan of the testator to determine whether the plan will be
emasculated by separation. 127 If the disposition meets both tests,
the disposition can be horizontally separated. Thus, in the situa-
tion presented by illustration one, if it is determined that T's
primary or dominant interest is not to benefit his children, grand-
children and so forth, but rather to use these individuals as a
means to control the disposition of the property for longer than
the period allowed by the rule, the entire scheme will fail. If
this test is met the next test requires the comparison of the dis-
position with separation to the original. The separation of the
remainder interests to the great grandchildren W1, w2 , x1, x2, y1,
y2, z1 and z2 will not affect the life estates of A and B, and their
children A1, A2, B, and B2 . The testator's intent is to benefit
his children, and their children even if the testator cannot benefit
his great grandchildren due to operation of the rule.
In applying the doctrine of vertical separability, the consid-
eration of the testator's organic plan is used somewhat differently.
The testator's intent is first determined ,12s then this intent is
used as a reason supporting separability,129 not as a test or standard
with which the separated disposition must comply as in horizontal
separability.130
The difference between the two considerations of the testator's
organic plan raises the question of what effect the testator's organic
plan will have on a disposition sought to be vertically separated
where there is an actual violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
rather than a violation by a hypothetical person as in Harrah
Estate. Such a factual situation arose in Morton Estate.'83 In that
case the testator devised the following trust: one-third income for
life to his daughter Bertha, two-thirds income for life to testator's
widow. On Bertha's death, her children were to take equally for
life, the remainder in fee to their children per stirpes. Four of
Bertha's children were living at the testator's death, Thomas,
Samuel, Isabel, and Clair. James a fifth child was born subsequent
to the testator's death. (For clarity the 2/3 interest is disregarded,
but the principles concerning the 1/3 interest are applicable.)
Diagrammatically the devise would be as follows:
126. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
127. See notes 56-61 and acbompanying text supra.
128. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
129. Jones Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437 (Alleg. O.C. 1962).
130. Quigley Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 A. 85 (1938).
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(Illustration Six)
Under the ruling of Harrah Estate the remainder to the issue of
the hypothetical after-born child of Bertha can, by vertical sepa-
rability, be separated and isolated from the remainders to the
actual born children.1a2 But whether vertical separability will
be available to separate and isolate the violation of the rule by the
remainder to the issue of the actual after-born child of Bertha,
James, is not answered by the court because the issue did not arise.
The case is made more interesting by the fact that James' demise
prior to his earlier-born brothers and sisters results in the situation
where the remainder to his issue is void because of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, but the remainders to his brothers' and sisters' issue
may not be void even though the vesting will occur at a later
date!1 33
Applying the consideration of the testator's organic plan the
case poses a difficult problem. Can it be said, as in Jones Estate,
1 34
that failure to separate the remainder to Jame's issue would
frustrate and nullify the organic plan of the testator? It is sub-
mitted that the better consideration of the testator's organic plan in
problems of vertical separability would be the consideration em-
ployed by Circuit Judge Goodrich in Smith's Estate v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue:13
5
[I] f the settlor knew that the trust would be held void as to
the children of her daughter's children who would be born
after the trust was executed, she would have nevertheless
intended the valid portions of the trust should remain
intact. 3
6
132. Harrah Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950); Morton Estate, 50
Pa. D. & C.2d 8, 11 (Phila. O.C. 1971).
133. Morton Estate, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 8, 13 (Phila. O.C. 1971).
134. The possibilities test used because testator's death was before
1948. 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 437, 457 (Alleg. O.C. 1962).
135. 140 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944).
136. Id. at 764.
Using this consideration is more in line with the rationale in
Quigley's Estate for it makes use of the testator's organic plan as
a comparative test rather than as a reason for separability.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rule Against Perpetuities is the judicial and now legisla-
tive manifestation of social policy allowing present generations to
deal with property unchained to the grave. The particular form
the rule takes may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and,
as in Pennsylvania, may differ with the passage of time, but under-
lying the rule's peculiarities in different places and at different
times is social policy. In apposition to the social policy demand-
ing unfettered property is the desire to allow the past generation
to be selective in passing their accumulations on to the present
generation.
One solution to the conflict of these policies has been the
doctrine of separability which follows the spirit of the former
policy without sacrificing the latter. Thus, in applications of
separability to avoid the harsher consequences of the rule, the
testators' intentions have been a crucial point. Cognizance of the
policies behind the Rule Against Perpetuities and separability is
the basis of their use and the understanding of them.
WILLIAM J. MUnPHY
